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THE FAIR CREDIT REPORTING ACT-FROM
THE REGULATORS VANTAGE POINT
Sheldon Feldman*
This article evaluates the impact of the Fair Credit Report-
ing Act' (FCRA) on the American consumer. It reviews the
benefits and the inadequacies of this legislation from the view-
-point of a member of the staff of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion, the agency primarily charged with enforcing the Act. This
article does not deal with the embryonic development of the legis-
lation from the early days of congressional hearings involving
the right of privacy up to passage of the Act in 1970, as other ar-
ticles have already accomplished a thorough exposition in this
area.
2
The Act was passed after it became increasingly evident in
congressional hearings that a law was needed to regulate the credit
reporting industry. Testimony at the hearings was replete with
cases of people who had been rendered virtually unemployable
or who had been refused credit on the basis of inaccurate and
damaging reports.' Since it is imperative that information for
purposes of credit extension or employment be available, no one
wished to abolish credit reporting. But the need for an accurate
trade association reporting system that would not only protect con-
sumers but would 'better serve the credit industry was apparent.4
Eventually, even the industry's main Associated Credit Bureaus,
* A.B., 1957, George Washington University; J.D. with Honors, 1961,
George Washington University; Assistant Director for Special Statutes, Federal
Trade Commission. The statements in this article represent only the views of
a member of the Federal Trade Commission staff. They are not intended to
be, and should not be construed as, representative of official Federal Trade Com-
mission policy.
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-81t (1970) [hereinafter cited as either FCRA or the
Act].
2. See, e.g., McNamara, The Fair Credit Reporting Act: A Legislative Over-
view, 22 J. OF PUBLIC L. 67 (1973); Redding, Fair Credit Reporting Act and
Non-Consumer Credit Information, 54 J. OF BANK LENDING 24 (1971); Ward,
The Consumer Credit Protection Act: An Analysis of Public Policy Formulation,
5 J. OF CONs. AFFAIRS 196 (1971).
3. What to Do If Your Credit Goes Bad, CONSUMER REPORTS, Apr., 1971
at 257.
4. Id.
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Inc., ceased its opposition and, after numerous compromises in the
committees of Congress, the Fair Credit Reporting Act became
law.5
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE LEGISLATION
The Fair Credit Reporting Act is important consumer pro-
tection legislation for practical as well as theoretical or philosophi-
cal reasons. As a practical matter, the legislation is an attempt
to regulate a vast network of consumer reporting agencies that
furnish approximately 100 million credit reports annually through
2,600 credit bureaus7 and an additional thirty to forty million
investigative reports annually through a handful of investigative
consumer reporting agencies.' The needs of the consumer credit
and insurance industries for these reports have not diminished
over recent years9 and there appears little likelihood that they
will in the future. It is possible, however, that the nature of
information sought may change depending upon the extent to
which the investigative reporting industry modifies the nature
of its reports due to future legislative or administrative disclosure
5. Id.
6. The term "consumer reporting agency" is used throughout this article to
refer to all organizations regulated by the Act. It applies to,
any person which, for monetary fees, dues, or on a cooperative non-
profit basis, regularly engages in whole or in part in the practice of
assembling or evaluating consumer credit information or other informa-
tion on consumers for the purpose of furnishing consumer reports to
third parties, and which uses any means or facility of interstate com-
merce for the purpose of preparing or furnishing consumer reports.
FCRA § 603(f), 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(f) (1970).
7. This figure is an estimate based upon testimony by John L. Spafford,
President, Associated Credit Bureaus, Inc., testifying on S. 2360 before the Sub-
committee on Consumer Credit, Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Af-
fairs, U.S. Senate, October 1, 1973. During a subsequent press conference in
December 1973, W. Lee Burge, President, Retail Credit Company, stated that
in the two and one-half years since enactment of the FCRA, Retail Credit com-
pleted approximately seventy million reports. Washington Star-News, Dec. 21,
1973, at A-2.
8. The majority of these reports (over thirty million) are furnished by the
nation's largest consumer reporting company, Retail Credit Company of Atlanta,
Georgia. An "investigative consumer report" is defined in section 603(e) of the
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(e) (1970), as,
a consumer report or portion thereof in which information on a consum-
er's character, general reputation, personal characteristics, or mode of
living is obtained through personal interviews with neighbors, friends, or
associates of the consumer reported on or with others with whom he is
acquainted or who may have knowledge concerning any such items of in-
formation. However, such information shall not include specific factual
information on a consumer's credit record obtained directly from a
creditor of the consumer or from a consumer reporting agency when
such information was obtained directly from a creditor of the consumer
or from the consumer.
9. Associated Credit Bureaus, Inc., estimates that reports were furnished by
its approximately 2,600 member bureaus, as follows: 1969-101.9 million;
1970-92.8 million; 1971-93.3 million; 1972-99.4 million.
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requirements. 10
The importance of the consumer credit industry in today's
marketplace needs no documentation. This 176 billion dollar in-
dustry depends to a large extent upon ready, inexpensive access
to information concerning consumers from whom there is an
ever-increasing demand for extension of credit. The insurance in-
dustry purchases millions of consumer reports each year in order
to evaluate the risks involved in extending coverage in life, acci-
dent and health, automobile, homeowner and other types of
insurance. To a lesser but significant degree, prospective em-
ployers purchase consumer reports to evaluate applicants, and
even to evaluate current employees, although there is little reliable
data to measure the extent to which consumer reports are pur-
chased for employment purposes." Without credit or insurance
most consumers could not own or operate an automobile, pur-
chase a dwelling, or protect it and its contents from destruction
or theft. In today's society, it is clear that the need for accurate
information in the realm of credit extension and insurance cover-
age is accorded highest priority by both applicants and business-
men.
In addition to recognition of the practical importance of
the consumer reporting industry to users as well as subjects of
these reports, there is a philosophical concern with unwarranted
or excessive invasion of privacy and the right of an individual to
exercise some control over the nature of the information collected,
stored and disseminated about him. This latter issue often pre-
sents a basic conflict between rights of the consumer and those of
the reporting industry and the recipients of consumer reports. The
situation is aggravated by the fact that the vast majority of con-
sumers know virtually nothing about the functions of the consumer
reporting industry, and very little more about the decision-making
process employed by creditors and insurers.
Until 1971 the consumer reporting industry operated almost
entirely outside the scrutiny of state or federal regulators, and
functioned without the need or desire to involve consumers in its
operations.' 2 A few consumers had heard of something called
10. See, e.g., text following notes 56 and 57 infra.
11. One measure of the quantity of consumer reports used by employers is
Retail Credit Company's public statement to the effect that nine per cent of all
reports it furnishes are for employment purposes. Testimony of W. Lee Burge,
President, Retail Credit Company, Hearings on S. 2360 Before the Subcomm.
on Consumer Credit of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Af-
fairs, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
12. The few substantive state statutes covering consumer reporting are as fol-
lows: Aiuz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-1601 to 44-1656 (West Supp. 1973); CAL.
Civ. CoDE §§ 1750-57 (West 1973); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-431 to 36-
435 (West Supp. 1973); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 559.55 et seq. (West Supp. 1973);
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a credit bureau, but only a very small minority had ever had oc-
casion to visit one. Other segments of the industry, such as in-
vestigative reporting companies, loan exchanges 3 and medical in-
formation bureaus'" enjoyed almost complete anonymity. The
latter two agencies still essentially retain this status. It is not sur-
prising then that since the industry's activities were rarely pub-
licized by the media, virtually ignored during the consumer's edu-
cational process, and afforded a very low profile by the business
community, there was little or no manifestation of consumer in-
terest or concern until passage of the FCRA. Similarly, when
abuses remain submerged, there is no demand for real reform.
While occasionally novels such as George Orwell's 1984 stir citi-
zens to express concern about their right to be left alone, most
people are relatively disinterested until and unless they personally
experience a denial of a benefit based upon a rcporting agency's
erroneous information. This combination of ignorance and ap-
athy typified the general climate when the FCRA became law in
April 1971, and to a large extent is the situation that prevails
today.
Although few consumers vocalized concern for fair report-
ing practices during the early days of FCRA, there has been an
increasing stream of protest and demands for vigilance both in lit-
erature and by the mass media relating to invasions of privacy.
This concern emanates from a trend toward treating the individual
like an automaton.15 As awareness of the industry's practices
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93, § 50-68 (Supp. 1972); N.H. STAT. ANN. ch.
359-B, § 1-21 (Supp. 1973); N.M. STAT. ANN. §9 50-18-1 to 50-18-6 (Supp.
1973); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw §H 371-76 (McKinney Supp. 1973). Of these stat-
utes, only those in New Hampshire and Massachusetts are substantially the same
as the FCRA.
13. Loan Exchanges are generally cooperative information gathering organi-
zations, often owned by consumer finance companies (small loan companies).
They report only to their "members" and generally confine their reports to iden-
tifying the subject's existing creditors (loan amount and lender, by code number)
for prospective lenders. The FTC has ruled that loan exchanges are consumer
reporting agencies. 38 Fed. Reg. 4945 (1973).
14. Like loan exchanges, these organizations are specialized and virtually un-
known. The medical reporting industry was the subject of a full day of testi-
mony on October 3, 1973. Hearings on S. 2360 Before the Subcomm. on Con-
sumer Credit of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 93rd
Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
15. See A. MILLER, THE ASSAULT ON PRIVACY: COMPUTERS, DATA BANKS,
AND DossiERs (1971); A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM (1967); Miller, Com-
puters, Data Banks and Individual Privacy: A Review, 4 COLUM. HUMAN
RIGHTS L. REV. 1 (1972); Miller, The Credit Networks, Detour to 1984, NATION,
Je. 1, 1971, at 669; Nader, The Dossier Invades the Home, SATURDAY REV., Apr.
17, 1971, at 18-21; Schrag, Dossier Dictatorship, SATURDAY REV., Apr. 17, 1971,
at 25; Sesser, Big Brother Keeps Tabs on Insurance Buyers, Naw REPUBLIC, Apr.
27, 1968, at 11-12; Note, Credit Investigations and the Right to Privacy: Questfor a Remedy, 57 GEO. L.J. 509 (1969); Comment, Protection of the Consumer
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has gradually increased, the philosophical aspect of the FCRA
has become more prominent. This Act is the first federal effort
to protect the consumer's right to privacy. Its provisions limiting
access to the reporting agency's files for legitimate "need to know"
business reasons'" and denying access to government investigators
(except for identifying information such as name, address, and
employer)' 7 represent landmark steps by Congress to protect
citizens from unwarranted intrusions into their personal lives.
Many -believed that a vehicle was thus created by which these
early protections could be expanded into a full Bill of Rights,
balancing the consumer's right of privacy with the businessman's
right to know. In this writer's view, the Act falls far short of
such an accomplishment. Before discussing these shortcomings,
a review of the Act's protections is appropriate.
THE PROTECTIONS AFFORDED BY THE FCRA
The basic purpose of the law is to protect consumers from
inaccurate or obsolete information contained in a report which is
used as a factor in determining an individual's eligibility for credit,
insurance or employment. It does not apply to reports utilized
for business, commercial, or professional purposes.' 8
The Act was designed-in large part by the reporting in-
dustry itself-to impose a broad standard of accuracy in report-
ing. Therefore, it required the adoption of "reasonable proce-
dures to assure maximum possible accuracy of the information
concerning the individual about whom the report relates." 9 While
the word "relevancy" appears in the Findings and Purpose Sec-
tion ° of the Act, therd are in fact no relevancy requirements
or other restraints upon the type of information that can be col-
lected by the reporting industry.
There are, however, several basic rights created by the law.
Notification of Adverse Action
Whenever a consumer is denied or charged more for credit
Interests and the Credit Rating Industry, 2 PAC. L.J. 635 (1971); Comment, Pro-
tecting the Subjects of Credit Reports, 80 YALE L.J. 103,5 (1971).
16. FCRA § 604, 15 U.S.C. § 1681b (1970).
17. FCRA § 608, 15 U.S.C. § 1681f (1970).
18. The term "commercial reports" is used to apply to reports prepared con-
cerning businesses or for purposes other than credit or insurance for personal,
family or household purposes. While the Act does not expressly exclude com-
mercial reports, the legislative history is replete with such references. See state-
ment of Representative Sullivan, H. REP. No. 15073, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess.
(1970), reported in 116 CONG. REc. 10053 (1970).
19. FCRA § 607, 15 U.S.C. § 1681e (1970).
20. FCRA § 604, 15 U.S.C. § 1681b (1970).
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or insurance, or denied employment because of information in a
report form a consumer reporting agency, he has the right to
be so informed. The name and address of the reporting agency
must also be disclosed to the consumer." In this manner, he is
given the opportunity to discover the existence of any adverse in-
formation and thereby avail himself of the right to correct any
erroneous information in his file. If credit is denied because of
information from some third party source that is not a "con-
sumer reporting agency" the Act gives the consumer the right to
learn "the nature of the information" directly from the prospec-
tive creditor.22
Access to Information in a Credit File
The consumer has the right of access to his file to learn
"the nature and substance" of the information in the file at the con-
sumer reporting agency, whether or not adverse action has been
taken.23 All information in the file is available to him, with the
exception of medical information and the sources of investiga-
tive information, which can only be obtained through court or-
dered discovery procedures. The phrase "nature and substance
of all information" has been interpreted to mean that the indivi-
vidual need not be permitted to physically handle or receive a
copy of his file. However, the Act does not prohibit the reporting
agency from doing either if it so desires. The consumer has the
right to be accompanied by one other person of his choice when
his file is discussed.24
Sources and Recipients of Information
The consumer has the right to be told the sources of infor-
mation in his file except that the sources of information acquired
solely for use in preparing investigative reports need not be dis-
closed except under appropriate discovery procedures in court.
The identity of recipients of reports pertaining to the consumer
during the preceding six months for credit or insurance purposes,
and the preceding two years for employment purposes must also
be disclosed.2 5
Confidentiality
The consumer has the right to have the information in his
file kept confidential and reported only for credit, employment,
21. FCRA § 615(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1681m(a) (1970).
22. FCRA § 615(b), 15 U.S.C. § 1681m(b) (1970).
23. FCRA § 609(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 1681g(a)(1) (1970).
24. FCRA § 610(d), 15 U.S.C. § 1681h(d) (1970). Presumably the person
accompanying the consumer could be an attorney.
25. FCRA § 609(a)(2), (3), 15 U.S.C. § 1681g(a)(2), (3), (1970).
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insurance, government license or benefit, or other "legitimate
business" purposes.26  The only exception to this confidentiality
is when disclosure is ordered by a court or is made in accord-
ance with the written instructions of the consumer.
Reinvestigation of Disputed Entries
The law requires that consumer reporting agencies reinves-
tigate, within a reasonable time, disputed items of information
and correct these if they are found to be inaccurate.2 7  Inaccurate
or unverifiable information must be deleted from the file. If
the dispute is not resolved, the reporting agency must note the
existence of the dispute and if it is submitted enclose in the con-
sumer's file a brief statement of the consumer's version of the
dispute. a
Care and Accuracy
In addition to the general requirement that consumer report-
ing agencies provide only reports requested for certain legitimate
business purposes, and -that procedures are maintained to assure
maximum possible accuracy of all consumer reports, agencies
must maintain reasonable procedures to assure that recipients of
the reports certify that they are authorized to receive them. More-
over, agencies must make reasonable efforts to verify the iden-
tity of new prospective users as well as the intended uses of the
consumer report prior to its release.29
Elimination of Obsolete Data; Adverse Public Record Information
As a rule, adverse information may not be reported if older
than seven years (there are a few exceptions, such as bankruptcy,
which may be reported for fourteen years), unless the consumer's
application involves credit or insurance amounting to $50,000 or
more.0 As to public record information, reporting agencies
have an option to follow one of two procedures: the agency
either must notify the consumer when adverse public record in-
26. FCRA § 604, 15 U.S.C. § 1681b (1970).
27. FCRA § 611(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a) (1970).
28. The Act does not provide that the consumer reporting agency must dis-
close to the consumer his right to file a statement disputing the information in
the file.
29. FCRA § 607(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(a) (1970).
30. FCRA § 605, 15 U.S.C. § 1681c (1970). Although the provisions of
this section are not applicable to credit transactions involving $50,000 or more
virtually all credit bureaus attempt to delete obsolete adverse information from
their files after seven years because of the impracticality of maintaining two sets
of files. Further, such agencies do not wish to undertake the risk of reporting
obsolete information.
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formation (such as suits, tax liens and arrests) is being reported
to a potential employer, or it must maintain strict procedures to
verify the current status of such public record items. In addi-
tion, adverse investigative information (except public record in-
formation) must be reverified after three months before it can be
included in any report.
Advance Notification of Investigative Consumer Reports
The law requires that those who procure or request investi-
gative consumer reports"' must inform the consumer in writing:(a) that such an investigation may be made, or if already ordered,
will be made; and (ib) that the consumer has the right to make a
written request for disclosure of the nature and scope of the in-
vestigation, which can be accomplished by disclosure of the items
or questions which the investigation will cover, the types and num-
ber of sources, and the name and address of the agency in-
volved.82 This advance notice does not apply if the report is
for employment purposes and the subject has not specifically
applied for a position.88
Obtaining Information in a File by False Pretenses
The law provides criminal penalties for obtaining under
false pretenses 4 information on a consumer from consumer re-
porting agencies and ;providing information to someone unau-
thorized to receive it.88
Legal Recourses
The -private enforcement provisions of the FCRA permit
the consumer to bring a civil suit for willful noncompliance
with the Act, with no ceiling placed on the amount of possible
punitive damages. 38  The consumer may also sue for actual dam-
ages he sustained by reason of negligent non-compliance with the
Act. 7  Attorney's fees, as determined by the court, may be re-
covered for both forms of action.
31. See note 8 supra.
32. FCRA § 606(a), (b), 15 U.S.C. § 1681d(a), (b) (1970).
33. FCRA § 606(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 1681d(a)(2) (1970).
34. FCRA § 619, 15 U.S.C. § 1681q (1970). In the unreported case of
United States v. Lindell, CR 3-2553 (N.D. Tex., indictment filed Dec. 13, 1971)
the defendants pleaded guilty to violating this section by conspiring to obtain
consumer reports for impermissible purposes. Defendant Lindell was sentenced
to eighteen months and defendant Zareff to two years, although both defendants
were granted probation.
35. FCRA § 620, 15 U.S.C. § 1681r (1970).
36. FCRA § 616, 15 U.S.C. § 1681n (1970). The author knows of no such
suit to date.
37. FCRA § 617, 15 U.S.C. § 1681o (1970).
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A two year statute of limitations from the date liability
arises is provided for civil suits. However, where the defendant
has willfully misrepresented information required by law to be dis-
closed to a consumer, and that information is material to the es-
tablishment of the defendant's liability, the statute does not be-
gin to run until discovery of such misrepresentation. Suit may
be brought in any appropriate federal district court without re-
gard to the amount in controversy, or in any other court of com-
petent jurisdiction. 8
A consumer reporting agency, any user of information, or
any person who supplies information will not be subject to
a consumer's civil action for defamation or invasion of pri-
vacy based upon information disclosed by a consumer reporting
agency pursuant to the Act, unless the information is false and
furnished with malice or willful intent to injure such consumer
or furnished negligently in noncompliance with the Act.8"
Administrative Enforcement
Compliance with the Act is enforced by the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) with respect to consumer reporting agen-
cies, users of reports, and all others involved who are not regu-
lated by another federal agency. The Commission can use its
cease-and-desist power and any other procedural, investigative
and enforcement powers which it has under the Federal Trade
Commission Act40 to secure compliance, irrespective of commerce
or any other jurisdictional tests in the FTC Act.4 ' Enforce-
ment of compliance on the part of financial institutions is dele-
gated to those federal agencies that exercise existing enforcement
jurisdiction over such businesses.42
In sum, the statutory scheme permits a reporting agency to
collect any kind of information, store it in any manner desired
and sell it to anyone with a commercial need for it. Further, the
Act attaches virtually no civil liability to the occurrence of report-
ing erroneous information, and requires disclosure to the con-
sumer but not complete access to his file. The basic approach
requires that if adverse action is taken on the basis of the infor-
mation, the user will so inform the consumer, who has the
right to know and challenge that information without cost. There
is no right to prevent an investigation or to know who maintain-
38. FCRA § 618, 15 U.S.C. § 1681p (1970).
39. FCRA § 610(e), 15 U.S.C. § 1681h(e) (1970).
40. 15 U.S.C. § 45-46 (1970).
41. FCRA § 621(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1681s(a) (1970); The Federal Trade
Commission Act is found at 15 U.S.C. § 41 et seq. (1970).
42. FCRA § 621(b), 15 U.S.C. § 1681s(b) (1970).
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ed or sold information on the subject, but the consumer has
the right to be notified by a user if the user ordered a "personal"
investigation, (that is, an "investigative consumer report") con-
cerning the consumer. To furnish erroneous information is not
considered in and of itself illegal, so long as the reporter "main-
tained reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accur-
acy" of the information. In spite of numerous and obvious am-
biguities in the statutory language, Congress chose to withhold
substantive rulemaking authority from the Federal Trade Commis-
sion which was charged with enforcement responsibility.4 3
In this writer's view, the basic approach of this legislation
is sound. That is, the consumer reporting agency must be free to
collect information without having to try to apply the virtually
impossible test of "relevancy" to each item collected. Business-
men should be free to purchase the information and use it for
legitimate commercial purposes, so long as they notify the con-
sumer when adverse action is taken wholly or partly because of the
information obtained. Users' compliance with this notification
appears to be high when there is an economic incentive to in-
form the subject of the reason for the adverse action, that is, when
the user desires to extend credit or sell insurance. However, as
will be explored in the next section, when there is no incentive
to notify, as in the employment situation, the statutory scheme
becomes inoperative. The rules on access by users, obsolescence
and challenge, appear to be generally fair to consumers and real-
istic for reporter and user alike. It is in the realm of access
by consumers, deterrence to noncompliance, personal investiga-
43. Congress specifically considered giving the Commission rulemaking au-
thority under FCRA and, in the course of its compromise when the legislation
was being finalized, deleted this provision. Representative Sullivan, the Chair-
woman of the House conferees, made the following statement as part of the leg-
islative history of the Fair Credit Reporting Act:
The provisions on credit reporting in the conference bill are not nearly
as strong as I felt they should be-and as a majority of the House con-
ferees attempted to make them-but they are, in my opinion, a major
improvement on S. 823 as passed by the Senate.
The Senate conferees would not agree to two key proposals of the
House conferees: one to require credit reporting companies to notify
all consumers once of the existence of an active file containing personal
data about them; and the other to give the Federal Trade Commission
power to issue regulations to implement the Act and to meet changing
circumstances as they develop. Neither omission is fatal to the effec-
tiveness of the legislation, but both proposals would have been ex-
tremely useful in helping consumers to protect their good names. We
agreed at the termination of the conference that if experience shows
that these key provisions proposed by the House conferees are, in fact,
as important to the purposes of the law as I believe them to be, we
will, of course, reopen the legislation for those and any other improve-
ments experience shows are necessary.
H.R. REP. No. 15073, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess. (1970), reported in 116 CONG. REC.
10050 (1970).
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tions, and notice by users, that demonstrable inadequacies have
surfaced.
SHORTCOMINGS OF THE FCRA-SEEKING A LEGISLATIVE
SOLUTION
As was stated at the outset, this article is primarily a sub-
jective evaluation of the adequacy of the FCRA; it does not at-
tempt to review the Commission's enforcement program. As a
frame of reference, however, it is necessary to note that the Com-
mission's enforcement efforts under the Act have included the
wide dissemination of a forty-six page booklet explaining the in-
dustry's compliance obligations, with illustrative forms for cer-
tain disclosures;44 production of a consumer education pamphlet
45
and buyer's guide on the Act46 to aid consumers in understand-
ing their rights; and the publication of six formal Interpretations
after conducting public hearings and considering over 1,000 writ-
ten comments.47
The staff's FCRA enforcement program included several
surveys to ascertain compliance, one of which covered all major
life insurance companies, the nation's primary users of investi-
gative consumer reports. A program of credit bureau examina-
tion is maintained, on a sampling basis, in the Commission's
twelve regional offices. The Commission concluded two FCRA
investigations by issuing final orders covering a total of six
credit bureaus for alleged violations of the FCRA.4" Currently
44. FTC, DivisioN OF SPECIAL STATUTES, COMPLIANCE WITH THE FAIR
CREDIT REPORTING ACT (2d ed. May 7, 1973).
45. FlC, KNow YOUR RIGHTS UNDER THE FAIR CREDIT REPORTINO ACT
(Consumer Bulletin No. 7, 1972).
46. FrC, FAIR CREDIT REPORTING ACT (Buyer's Guide No. 7).
47. These Interpretations, which are advisory in nature,
(1) prohibit publication and distribution by credit bureaus of books
containing consumers' credit ratings, called "credit guides", unless en-
coded to insure consumers' anonymity;
(2) allow the use of certain kinds of "protective bulletins" which iden-
tify check forgers, swindlers and the like-provided no information in
them is used in establishing the subject's eligibility for credit, insurance
or employment;
(3) require that consumers be informed by prospective lenders when
they are denied credit on the basis of information furnished by loan
exchanges;
(4) require that when an insurance company uses a state motor vehi-
cle report to deny or increase the cost of a consumer's insurance, it
inform him of that fact and of the state agency's identity;
(5) permit consumer reporting agencies to pre-screen prospects' names
for credit worthiness for direct mail solicitations provided the user cer-
tifies that every person on the list furnished by the credit bureau will
receive the solicitation; and,
(6) conclude that reporting activities of federal agencies such as the
Civil Service Commission are not currently included within the scope
of the FCRA.
See FCRA Interpretations §§ 600.1-600.6, 38 Fed. Reg. 4945-47 (1973).
48. The Credit Bureau of Columbus, Docket No. C-2333 (F.T.C., final order
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in adjudication is a case against the nation's largest consumer re-
porting agency.49
Informal surveys and investigations have proved extremely
valuable in determining the impact of this new law and in pro-
viding a basis for the development of recommendations for leg-
islative improvements in the Act. However, the Commission has
completed no statistically reliable survey to document its conclu-
sion that the Fair Credit Reporting Act is not an effective tool in
achieving the goals desired by Congress. What the FTC has
learned about the Act's shortcomings stems from observing at-
tempts at compliance, and from complaint letters by consumers °
who were confused and often 'bitter about the "protection" af-
forded them by this Act.
The House of Representatives, holding oversight hearings
on the FCRA on July 24, 1973, heard the FTC call for a sweep-
ing revision of the Act, including specific amending language."'
Two weeks after these hearings, the FTC amendments were intro-
duced by Senator William Proxmire in the form of Senate Bill
2360.52
The facts surrounding a typical (and actual) consumer com-
plaint recently received by this writer were recounted during the
congressional testimony. The consumer had applied for an oil
company credit card and some time later received a form letter
which stated:
Our decision was based on our own credit policies and on
information (or lack of information) contained in a con-
sumer credit report. The Fair Credit Reporting Act affords
you the right to review this report at the office of Credit
Bureau of [name and address].
This applicant had applied for the credit card after moving
to a mid-western city from a large eastern city. The credit bu-
reau used was, naturally, in the eastern city. No phone number
was provided. Had it been, the long distance toll charges would
issued Dec. 15, 1972); Credit Bureau of Lorain, Docket No. C-2287 (F.T.C., fi-
nal order issued Sept. 9, 1972).
49. Retail Credit Co., Docket No. 8954 (F.T.C., complaint issued Feb. 21,
1974).
50. While an exact count of consumer complaints received by the Commis-
sion staff is unavailable, a check of headquarters and regional office records re-
veals that approximately 3,000 written complaints were submitted by consumers
to the Commission during the first two years of FCRA enforcement. This num-
ber excludes telephone inquiries and complaints, which were estimated at an ad-
ditional 2,000-during the period mentioned.
51. Testimony of Sheldon Feldman before the Subcommittee on Consumer
Affairs, Committee on Banking and Currency, House of Representatives, July 24,
1973.
52. See S. REP. No. 2360, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), reported in 119
CONo. REc. 15604 (1973).
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have been substantial, not to mention the length of time it often
takes to locate someone who can help. Had the applicant called
the bureau he still would not have learned the reason for the ad-
verse action. First, the credit bureau would not know the rea-
son for the oil company's declination. Second, the credit bu-
reau will not send a copy of the file or any part of it through
the mail and will not read it over the telephone unless it first has
a letter from the consumer requesting oral disclosure (in which
case another toll charge would be involved).
Such consumer letters of frustration and confusion are re-
ceived every day by the FTC. Each varies somewhat but the
scenario has similarities. Sometimes the problem is the result of
the consumer's move to another city; on other occasions it is the
inability to travel to the site of the reporting company; or, the dif-
ficulty in finding someone at the reporting agency who can pin-
point the consumer's problem even after repeated calls. After re-
ceiving hundreds of letters during the past three years, it has be-
come clear that the Act is not succeeding. It is unintelligible and
frustrating to consumers, and those actions taken to comply by
reporters or users have fallen short of what consumers consider
reasonable under the circumstances. The entire procedure, from
the beginning (the user's disclosure) to the end (the correction
of erroneous information and renotification) has proven to be
ineffective. The best documentation of this assertion is a descrip-
tion of what actually happens in the process of "compliance."
Disclosure by Users of Consumer Reports
The Act requires disclosure to consumers by users of con-
sumer reports if credit is refused." The prospective creditor must
either disclose the name of the credit bureau that provided the
information or make direct disclosure if the information was re-
ceived from some other source. 4  As the very first step in trig-
gering the exercise of a consumer's right under the Act, the user's
disclosure must be effective. It is not!
One major chain department store has indicated that twenty-
five per cent of all applicants for credit are refused on the basis
of consumer reports. That is, one out of every four applicants
is now receiving a section 615(a) disclosure. Yet that same
user estimated that only one out of ten recipients of its notification
actually proceeded to obtain disclosure of what was in his file. 5
53. FCRA § 615(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1681m(a) (1970).
54. FCRA § 615(b), 15 U.S.C. § 1681m(b) (1970).
55. Retail Credit Company's experience has been that six-tenths of one per
cent of its reports issued from April 1971 to December 1973 resulted in subse-
quent interviews (430,000 interviews out of seventy million reports). Press Con-
ference by W. Lee Burge, Washington Star-News Dec. 21, 1973, at A-2.
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This discrepancy cannot be explained, as one user has suggested
to the writer, because ",those dead beats already know what's
in their files." True, some consumers may have reason to know
there is derogatory information in their files that will remain there
after their visit. But that is not the full answer. The results of
our own informal staff survey of section 615(a) recipients cor-
roborated the fact that less than twenty-five per cent of those per-
sons notified of an adverse credit report went to the credit bu-
reaus identified, but the reasons given ran the gamut from dis-
trust of the bureau, misunderstanding of their right to challenge
information, to the inconvenience of making the visit in light of
the benefit (another new credit account) being sought. Some con-
sumers stated that they just thought it would not do any good to
visit the bureau.
The section 615(a) disclosures are often unclear because
the law has been interpreted by many users to require disclosure
when the user orders a report even though the report simply re-
veals nothing. The identification of the credit bureau in such in-
stances frustrates the consumer and credit bureau alike. Upon
taking steps to get disclosure, which could involve taking a half
day from work, the consumer is finally granted an "interview"
only to learn that "there's nothing wrong with your file." What
actually happened was either (a) an item of non-adverse in-
formation was used as a factor in denying the application (age,
nature of occupation, length of residence) or (b) there was simply
not enough information in the file. Neither of these factors can
be discovered from the current section 615(a) disclosure, and
neither factor is explained by the credit bureau during its inter-
view. 56
56. What the consumer reporting agency is required to disclose to the con-
sumer is outlined in section 609 which provides:
(a) Every consumer reporting agency shall, upon request and
proper identification of any consumer, clearly and accurately disclose
to the consumer:
(1) The nature and substance of all information (except medical
information) in its files on the consumer at the time of the request.(2) The sources of the information; except that the sources of in-formation acquired solely for use in preparing an investigative consumer
report and actually used for no other purpose need not be disclosed:
Provided, That in the event an action is brought under this title, such
sources shall be available to the plaintiff under appropriate discovery
procedures in the court in which the action is brought.(3) The recipients of any consumer report on the consumer which
it has furnished(A) for employment purposes within the two-year period pre-
ceding the request, and(B) for any other purpose within the six-month period pre-
ceding the request.(b) The requirements of subsection (a) respecting the disclosure
of sources of information and the recipients of consumer reports do not
apply to information received or consumer reports furnished prior to
[Vol. 14
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The remedy for this problem is clear. The user should be
obligated to identify the item of information in the report used to
take adverse action (this could be accomplished by simply cir-
cling the item (s) on a copy of the report) or, if no item of informa-
tion is involved, to state the reason for the adverse action (such
as "not enough information"). Further, the use should provide
a copy of the actual document utilized. There is no other way
for the consumer to be certain that the reasons given are in fact
based upon the report and, more significantly, there is no other
way to be certain that a subsequent interview at the consumer
reporting agency will be worth pursuing. The only way to en-
courage consumers to seek an interview with the reporting agency
is to arm the consumer, at the outset, with a copy of the con-
sumer report. This may add a measure of cost and inconveni-
ence to users, but some expense is inherent in complying with
any consumer protection law. The cost can be minimized (or
eliminated entirely for the user) by having the reporting agency
provide a duplicate report. Since the section 615(a) disclosure is
made in writing, modifying the user's current form letter and en-
closing a copy of the report (or a copy of a summary taken from
a telephoned report) are not unreasonable compliance obliga-
tions to impose upon users.
Extending the user's disclosure requirement whenever any
adverse action is taken is necessary because consumer reports
are used to deny many benefits beyond those of credit, insurance
and employment. These reports are used in a wide variety of cir-
cumstances such as consideration of applicants for leases to rent
apartments, check-cashing privileges, and qualification for dis-
ability payments. There is no valid reason to attempt to include
within the Act a comprehensive list of consumer report uses that
will require disclosure by the user. Nor is there a need to attempt
to guess what future uses might arise. The section 615(a) dis-
closures requirement should be broad enough to cover adverse
actions generally. Although the Act requires users of informa-
tion from a consumer reporting agency to make disclosure when-
ever credit, insurance or employment is denied, information from
a person other than a consumer reporting agency need only be
disclosed whenever credit is denied. 7 However, the proposed
FTC amendment to expand user disclosure requirements to in-
formation received from a source other than a consumer report-
ing agency is limited to insurance because of the practical diffi-
the effective date of this title except to the extent that the matter in-
volved is contained in the files of the consumer reporting agency on
that date.
FCRA § 609, 15 U.S.C. § 1681g (1970).
57. FCRA § 615, 15 U.S.C. § 1681m (1970).
19741
SANTA CLARA LAWYER [Vol. 14
culty of seeking and enforcing compliance in other situations.58
Nevertheless, extending the coverage of section 615(b) beyond
credit applications to insurance underwriting would be a major
improvement over the Act's current application.
Once the user's disclosure is extended and improved, the
consumer will be armed with an explanation of the action, the
actual document employed (along with some decoding device, if
necessary, so that it will be comprehensible) and the full iden-
tity of the reporting company if one is involved. The next
step in such cases is contact with the consumer reporting agency.
Consumer Reporting Agency Disclosure
The most criticized feature of the Fair Credit Reporting
Act is the lack of adequate disclosure 'by the consumer reporting
agency. Improvement of agency disclosure, along with user's dis-
closure, should have the highest priority. Currently the consu-
mer is not entitled to visually inspect, copy or physically handle
his file when he seeks disclosure. In the realm of investigative re-
porting, where highly personal information abounds, the consu-
mer often feels that he never learns the full content of his file.
For whatever reasons--perhaps a knowledge that the in-
formation is unconfirmed or a fear that a lengthy and expen-
sive reinvestigation would ensue-reporting agencies can and do
withhold information from consumers with impunity. Since the
58. Proposed section 615 of the FCRA reads as follows:
(a) Whenever any adverse action is taken either wholly or partly
because of information contained in a consumer report from a consumer
reporting agency, the user of the consumer report shall-
(1) disclose in writing to the consumer against whom such ad-
verse action has been taken (A) the reason for taking such adverse ac-
tion, including reference to the particular item or items of information
contained in the consumer report upon which such adverse action has
been wholly or partly based; (B) the name, street address, and tele-
phone number of the consumer reporting agency making the report; and
(C) a statement of the fact that the consumer is entitled (i) to receive
a copy of his file from the consumer reporting agency at nominal
charge, or (ii) to inspect his file at the consumer reporting agency free
of charge if visited within 30 days of receipt of the user's notification;
and
(2) furnish a copy of the consumer report if the consumer report
was written, or furnish a copy of a summary if the consumer report
was oral.
(b) Whenever credit or insurance for personal, family, or house-
hold purposes, or employment involving a consumer is denied or the
charge for such credit or insurance is increased either wholly or partly
because of information obtained from a person other than a consumer
reporting agency bearing upon the consumer's credit worthiness, credit
standing, credit capacity, character, general reputation, personal char-
acteristics, or mode of living, the user of such information shall disclose
in writing to the consumer at the time such action is taken the reason
for such adverse action, and the nature of the information.
S. REP. No. 2360, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), reported in 119 CONG. RFc.
15605 (1973).
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consumer does not have the right to examine his own file or re-
ceive a copy of the information, he is unable to question the com-
pleteness of the disclosure. The procedures of reinvestigation and
correction of disputed information are similarly unsatisfactory.
Corrected reports are not always sent to recipients. Follow-up re-
ports often contain many of the inaccuracies found in the orig-
inal, challenged reports. Again, under the statute as it is currently
constituted, the consumer is helpless to protect himself against a
consumer reporting 'agency bent on circumventing the law.
The current procedure of having a "trained interviewer" read
the file is in direct derogation of 4 consumer's legitimate and
fundamental right to know. By any reasonable standard of fair-
ness, the consumer has a right to know exactly what information
is being collected and sold about him. Moreover, with the ex-
ception of national security and law enforcement investigations,
there is no reason to place credit, insurance and employment in-
vestigations on a level demanding anonymity of sources. If the
investigative reporting industry is utilizing sources that cannot be
revealed or if it is relying on personal opinions as information
sources in deciding whether or not there should be a denial of
credit, insurance or employment, then it may be that those sources
are better not used at all. In a country where privacy is a right
and due process is considered fundamental, the subject of a
credit, insurance or employment investigation cannot reasonably
be expected to protect himself unless he has the capability to learn
who is saying what about him. If people become more reticent
and consequently more careful about contributing to investigative
consumer reports because it may be revealed that they are the
source of the opinion expressed, there is reason to applaud that
result rather than avoid it.
Another area of concern relates to medical information.
The obligation to disclose the sources of such information has
been uncertain. The additional disclosure of the existence, of
medical information, proposed in Senate Bill 2360,5" corresponds
with the FTC proposal to clarify the existing requirement that the
sources of medical information should be disclosed.6°
59. All the information in a consumer's credit file must be disclosed includ-
ing the sources of information in investigative reports and medical information.
Reporting agencies have the option of disclosing medical information to the con-
sumer or to a physician of his choice. The current law does not require a re-
porting agency to divulge medical information or the source of investigative in-
formation. See S. REP. No. 2360, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), reported in 119
CONG. REC. 15604 (1973).
60. Such disclosure would be pursuant to FCRA section 609(c). See S. REP.
No. 2360, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), reported in 119 CoNG. REc. 15604
(1973).
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With respect to the added burdens upon the reporter, since
personal, visual inspection of the file would be permitted, a copy
of the file will often not be deemed necessary. The right to
request a copy of the file is essential in certain circumstances,
for instance, when the reporting agency is in a distant locale.
Although the consumer is entitled to a free-of-cost in-per-
son interview when adverse action is taken, he must pay the long
distance toll charges when a consumer report is furnished by a
consumer reporting agency that is geographically distant. 61 With
increasing regularity, computerization permits companies to fur-
nish consumer reports on a nationwide basis. This situation oc-
curs hundreds of times a day. Thus, for a great many con-
sumers, telephone toll charges are a major deterrent to receiving
disclosure. Such charges are in the nature of normal operating
business expenses and should be absorbed by the consumer re-
porting agency when the call is prompted by adverse action based
upon that agency's report.
Notice of Investigative Consumer Reports
The number of consumer complaints received which are based
upon investigative reports is not a true measure of the problem
because this type of reporting is still shrouded in secrecy. The
user's disclosure, pursuant to section 606,62 that an investigation
"may be made" has proved to be one of the most inadequate of
all Fair Credit Reporting Act provisions. If the intent of the
provision is to inform consumers that a personal investigation, in-
volving interviews with friends, neighbors and associates, will be
conducted, all indications from complaints received by the FTC
are that the disclosure is often neither noticed nor understood.
Moreover, the fact that there would be an investigation has rarely
been given by the consumer as the reason to "opt out" of a trans-
action.
Senate Bill 2360 proposes that there be authorization by
the consumer prior to any personal investigation. 63  Admittedly,
61. FCRA § 610(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 1681h(b)(2) (1970).
62. The current provisions of section 606, especially those of 606(b), are
complex and obscure. Explaining a consumer's rights under this section is very
difficult, unless both parties are lawyers.
Any person who procures or causes to be prepared an investigative con-
sumer report on any consumer shall, upon written request by the con-
sumer within a reasonable period of time after the receipt by him of
the disclosure required by subsection (a) (1), shall make a complete and
accurate disclosure of the nature and scope of the investigation re-
quested. This disclosure shall be made in writing, mailed or otherwise
elivered, to the consumer not later than five days after the date on
which the request for such disclosure was received from the consumer
or such report was first requested, whichever is later.
FCRA § 606(b), 15 U.S.C. § 1681d(b) (1970).
63. See note 52 supra.
[Vol. 14
FAIR CREDIT REPORTING
it is not anticipated that any significant segment of the populace
will decline to authorize an investigative consumer report once
asked to do so. An authorization, however, will provide a more
meaningful option, and some people will undoubtedly exercise
their right to decline to apply for a benefit once they fully under-
stand that the application will trigger such a personal inquiry.
Those who authorize such an investigation will be doing so con-
sciously, rather than by implication.
Reports for Employment Purposes
Section 615 requires disclosure to the consumer if adverse
action in regard to employment is taken as a result of informa-
tion in an agency report. However, a provision in section 606
(a) (2) permits investigative reports for employment purposes
without notice if the individual has not specifically applied for
a job. The FTC did not originally propose amending this excep-
tion because it was unaware of the extent to which employers
order investigative reports on persons who have not applied for a
position or who are current employees being considered for pro-
motion, transfer or retention. While there was no recommenda-
tion to delete section 606(a)(2) for this reason, it is clear that
without the prior authorizing action proposed 'for section 606(a)
(1), the unwitting subjects of those unauthorized investigations
are much less likely to receive the user's notification when ad-
verse action is taken on the basis of the reports.
In a matter of such highly personal sensitivity as employ-
ment, particularly when retention or reassignment is involved, the
subject has no way of learning if the reason for some action was
an investigative consumer report, except faith in the employer's
integrity. Since neither the subject nor the regulator can invade
the user's mind, fully enforcing section 615 will always be
virtually impossible in the employment reporting area. With sub-
jects such as credit and insurance, there is real incentive on the
user's part to make the disclosure, because of the economic gain
realized from granting credit of insurance. When there is some
incentive not to make the section 615 disclosure, which is often
,true in the case of employment decisions, the probability of non-
compliance is enhanced by the employer's freedom not to ob-
tain a section 606 authorization. The FTC's experience with one
particular consumer reporting agency, which makes reports only
for employment purposes, indicates that of the thousands of re-
ports furnished since enactment of the Fair Credit Reporting Act,
less than ten interviews were requested by individuals whose ap-
plications had been rejected.64 A major reason for the paucity of
64. This information is part of a pending non-public investigation currently
being conducted by the staff of the Commission.
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requests was non-disclosure by prospective employers. 5
On balance, the proposal to extend the authorization re-
quirement to all situations in which an employer orders an inves-
tigative consumer report is entirely appropriate. The employer
would still be free to investigate applicants and current employ-
ees in secret by conducting his own inquiry. Only when he used
the services of a consumer reporting agency would an authoriza-
tion be required.
Although there may be no way to effectively enforce the
Section 615 (a) notification requirement against users, there
is a way to afford some measure of protection to job applicants.
The only effective solution this writer can identify is to impose a
requirement upon the consumer reporting agency to furnish the
consumer with a copy of any report before it is released to a user
for employment purposes. Once an application for employment is
rejected, that position is usually gone forever. Subsequent correc-
tion of any erroneous information will not revive the lost opportuni-
ty, which of course is not usually the case with applications for cred-
it or insurance. Unless erroneous information can be corrected be-
fore the prospective employer considers the report, the protections of
the Act are illusory. A possible compromise, to substantially nar-
row the totality of reports that would have to be sent to applicants,
would be to limit this requirement to (a) investigative consumer re-
ports and (b) only those reports which contain "adverse" informa-
tion. Because of the delay in processing employment applications
that this requirement would entail, and -the burden of furnishing the
report to the applicant at least five days before the employer re-
ceives it, a reasonable balance would be achieved if this re-
quirement were limited to adverse investigative reports.0 6 This
would, however, be the absolute minimum protection necessary to
insure the effectiveness of the Fair Credit Reporting Act in em-
ployment situations.
65. Id.
66. On January 23, 1974, Senator Joseph R. Biden introduced S. 2883, which
would amend section 606 to add this exact requirement. The proposal is as fol-
lows:
(c) If an investigative consumer report contains information which
may be adverse to the consumer to whom it relates, a consumer report-
ing agency may not furnish that investigative consumer report to any
third party for employment purposes unless, at least five business days
prior thereto, such agency mails or otherwise delivers without charge
a copy of such report to the consumer to whom it relates, except that
any third-party medical information contained in the report shall be de-
leted and the consumer shall be advised of the existence of such infor-
mation and of his right to have such information furnished to a licensed
physician of his choice.
(2) By changing the present subsection (c) to subsection (d).
S. REP. No. 2883, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), reported in 119 CoNo. REc.
253 (1974).
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Scope of the Act
Application of the protections afforded by the Fair Credit
Reporting Act depends entirely upon the triggering term "con-
sumer reporting agency."' 7 That is, unless the "person" collect-
ing or reporting information comes within the narrow frame-
work of the definition, the information furnished by that person
cannot be construed as a "consumer report" and none of the ob-
jectives or concomitant benefits of the Act apply.
The question of whether the Civil Service Commission (CSC)
and other agencies which prepare pre-employment reports are
"consumer reporting agencies" subject to the Fair Credit Re-
porting Act arose in the spring of 1971 when an informal in-
terpretation was requested from the FTC. A request for a for-
mal interpretation subjecting the CSC to the provisions of the
FCRA came in December 1971 from private counsel represent-
ing a government employee who had been refused access to his
Civil Service employment file.
In early 1972 the FTC made informal responses to the par-
ties requesting a statement of its position, stating that the CSC
is not a "consumer reporting agency" within the meaning of sec-
tion 603(f) of the FCRA. A formal interpretation to this effect
was published in the Federal Register on October 7, 1972.8
The FTC reasoned that the definition of "consumer report-
ing agency" in section 603(f), which refers to "cooperative non-
profit basis" and "third parties", could not reasonably be con-
strued to apply to CSC reporting activity, especially in the ab-
sence of any legislative history to indicate that such a result was
intended. It was suggested that, had Congress intended to sub-
ject Federal agencies to compliance with the FCRA, it would
first have obtained testimony and other information concerning
the probable effects on the agencies being considered for inclu-
sion in the Act's coverage.
Prior to the effective date of the proposed formal interpre-
tation, comments urging that it be withdrawn or amended to sub-
ject the CSC -to the Act were received from several sources,
among them Senator William Proxmire, the original author of the
Act. The comments made the following contentions:
1. The information collected and disseminated to other agen-
cies by the CSC is often exactly the same as that sought
to be iegulated under the FCRA. This data may include com-
mentary on such matters as the subject's character, general reputa-
tion, personal characteristics, or mode of living, and the informa-
67. See note 6 supra.
68. FCRA Interpretation, 16 C.F.R. § 600.6 (1973).
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tion is routinely transmitted to various branches of the govern-
ment. Thus, the reasons for regulating CSC conduct in the col-
lection and handling of data for pre-employment reports are the
same as those which led to the passage of the Fair Credit Report-
ing Act.
2. The employee's need for privacy and accuracy is the
same regardless of whether his employer is the federal govern-
ment or a private business. If the Act is not amended to include
the CSC in its coverage, millions of potential and present federal
employees will be denied the same rights guaranteed to persons
employed or seeking employment in the private sector."9
3. The federal government should set an example of fair-
ness for the private sector, instead of being exempt from the
constraints placed upon other employers.
4. The exclusion of the CSC is inconsistent with the pur-
poses of the Act, one of which was the protection of citizens from
investigations by the government. Section 608 of the Act prohib-
its governmental agencies from obtaining any information (ex-
cept name and address and employer) from consumer reporting
agencies for "nonpermissible" purposes, including law enforce-
ment purposes. However, government agencies receiving CSC
reports, which may include data obtained from consumer report-
ing agencies, can make whatever use of them they wish, without
restraint.
In sum, the absence of legislative history and the apparent
anomalous results lead one to conclude that the exclusion of the
CSC from the FCRA was a Congressional oversight. There are
no circumstances which could make application of the Act to the
government unduly burdensome. The type of reports prepared
by the Civil Service Commission, as well as certain other agencies,
do not differ materially from investigative reports prepared by
consumer reporting agencies; the need of present and potential
federal employees for privacy and accurate reporting is no less
than those in the public sector, and the number of individuals
left unprotected is huge. In the absence of evidence that compli-
ance with the FCRA would constitute a crippling burden for the
federal government, there is no reason to maintain the defect in
the Act which is caused by this exclusion.
Administrative Enforcement
The problem inherent in enforcing compliance with the Fair
69. The number of non-military federal employees is currently estimated at
2.7 to 2.8 million. The number of persons who fall into the category of "poten-
tial employees" may be estimated from the fact that in 1972 the Civil Service
Commission processed 1.7 million applications.
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Credit Reporting Act can be attributed to the tremendous num-
ber of consumer reports sold annually and the difficulty, if not im-
possibility, of establishing that the purchaser of the report in fact
utilized the information as a factor in his decision to deny the con-
sumer a benefit. We are often confronted with consumers who
feel certain that their application for credit, insurance or employ-
ment was denied on the basis of a consumer report; yet we must
inform them that there is no practical way to enforce the notifica-
tion requirements of the law.
Moreover, while enforcement of compliance by consumer re-
porting agencies is always difficult, it has been made more so by
the recent court decision in FTC v. Retail Credit Co. 70  The
apparent inconsistency between sections 604 and 621 of the Act
has been cited by some consumer reporting agencies to deny FTC
investigators access to their files. Section 604 proscribes furnish-
ing a consumer report unless there is either a court order, written
instructions from the consumer whose file is involved, or a legiti-
mate business transaction. Section 621(a) grants the FTC proce-
dural, investigative and enforcement powers including the power
to issue procedural rules and require the production of docu-
ments. FTC v. Retail Credit Co. involved an administrative sub-
poena enforcement action brought because of a company's refusal
to grant access to or provide copies of consumer files except
within the framework of the provision of section 604.71 The Dis-
trict Court for the District of Columbia held that the Commis-
sion's authority under FCRA section 621 and FTC Act section
972 was inadequate to authorize FTC access to consumer re-
ports. The court then utilized section 604 to make the files
available by treating the Commission's request for the production
of the documents as a request for a "court order", which was
granted subject to certain notice and publishing procedures.
While the Commission maintains that section 621 does su-
persede or at least can be reconciled with section 604, and is ap-
pealing this decision, clarification of the Act would substantially
facilitate the process of administrative enforcement. It was pre-
sumed that the restriction imposed in section 604 was designed
to prevent furnishing "a consumer report" to users having no per-
missible purpose, rather than prevent the Commission from gain-
ing access to consumer reporting agency files for investigatory
purposes. Under section 621, the Federal Trade Commission is
required to enforce compliance with the requirements imposed
under the Act, and the Commission is specifically granted the
70. Civil No. 1508-72 (D.D.C. Apr. 23, 1973).
71. Id.
72. 15 U.S.C. § 49 (1973).
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power to require the production of documents under the Federal
Trade Commission Act. The Commission argued that under
Section 621 respondent was required to comply fully with the ad-
ministrative subpoena. The Commission contended that it must
have access to consumer reports to fulfill the statutory require-
ment of enforcing compliance with the Act. The company would
require the Commission to obtain a court order or the written
instruction of every consumer before seeking to investigate com-
pliance with the Act. A thorough investigation would involve
inspection of the consumer reports of thousands of consumers-
which would often effectively preclude obtaining ,the written in-
structions of each as a means of obtaining the consumer reports.
Also, certain investigations involve random sampling of consumer
files, or the production of all reports prepared by a certain em-
ployee of the consumer reporting agency as a means of determin-
ing if "reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accur-
acy" (required by section 607(b)) were used by the reporting
agency. The effect of the company's reading of section 604
would be a requirement that the Commission must always obtain
a court order to investigate compliance with the Act. This rea-
soning would nullify section 621 and would shift the burden of
enforcing compliance with the Act from the Commission to the
courts, cause intolerable delay and effectively negate enforce-
ment of compliance with the statute.78
The Commission argued that section 604 should not be read
in isolation, but rather in the context of the whole Act. In inter-
preting legislation, courts should not be guided by a single section
of the statute but must look to provisions of the whole law and
to its object and policy.74 Using this principle of statutory con-
struction, it is apparent that Congress intended that, without a
court order, or written instructions from the consumer, the Com-
mission should be provided reasonable access to consumer re-
ports in order to determine compliance with the Fair Credit Re-
porting Act.
Civil Liability Under FCRA
There is general agreement that sections 616 and 617 pro-
vide the injured consumer with more chance to be awarded dam-
ages than he had in most jurisdictions before the FQRA. Suits
for defamation were generally thwarted by the doctrine of condi-
73. There is a proscription against construing a statute so as to give it a
construction that would render it ineffective. United States v. Blasius, 397 F.2d
203, 206 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1008 (1970); General Motors
Acceptance Corp. v. Whisnut, 387 F.2d 774, 778 (5th Cir. 1968).
74. Richards v. United States, 396 U.S. 1, 11 (1962).
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tional privilege, which allowed credit reporting agencies to publish
defamatory information as a necessary part of their work. The
injured consumer could succeed in a suit for damages only by
showing that the agency had forfeited its conditional privilege by
preparing a report in a malicious manner, or so recklessly as to
constitute malice. Proof of negligence or of injury caused by a
negligent misstatement on the part of the agency had generally
been held to be insufficient grounds for recovery by the con-
Sumer. 7
5
Under the FCRA, the consumer may succeed in a suit for
damages by showing that the agency negligently failed to meet
the standards of care imposed by the Act (that is, it did not
follow "reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accur-
acy of the information" 6), and published an inaccurate report.
Liability may also be imposed where the reporting agency neg-
ligently fails to assure that its reports are made to persons hav-
ing proper authority to receive them, or negligently transmits
obsolete information. Before passage of the FCRA, the report-
ing of an arrest ten years earlier, for example, would be privileged
in a suit for defamation; under the FCRA, an agency that is neg-
ligent in not deleting that information would be technically lia-
ble.
However, placing the burden of proof of negligence on the
consumer seriously weakens the provisions attaching liability to
negligent noncompliance. While proving negligence should be
less difficult than proving malice or its equivalent and should put
less strain on courts that might look favorably upon a plaintiff's
suit, there will still be substantial difficulties, if only because the
requisite information is likely to be in the sole possession of the
defendant. An additional problem is caused by the FCRA's re-
quirement that no action "in the nature of defamation, invasion
of privacy or negligence" may be brought based on information
required to be disclosed under certain provisions of the statute
except for those actions provided for in the statute. 77 It is un-
clear whether this means that actions for defamation, invasion of
privacy and negligence may be brought under the FCRA or
whether only actions for willful or negligent noncompliance may
be brought under sections 616 and 617 of the FCRA and that
other kinds of actions may be brought only if the information
was not obtained under FCRA procedures.
In order to render the existing civil remedies more effective,
75. See Note, Liability for Misstatements by Credit-Rating Agencies, 43 VA.
L. REV. 561, 563-67 (1957).
76. FCRA § 607(b), 15 U.S.C. § 1681e (1970).
77. FCRA § 610(e), 15 U.S.C. § 1681h(e) (1970).
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it has been suggested that false reports should create a rebuttable
presumption of negligence 'by the agency, to be overcome by
demonstration of a reasonable effort to insure maximum possi-
ble accuracy of information. 71 Others have recommended that
negligent or malicious publication of misleading information
should also be acceptable grounds for recovery of damages, since
such information can be as harmful as a false report."
Clearly the type of civil actions allowed under the FCRA
give consumer reporting agencies no real incentive to correct in-
accuracies, since the amount of monetary damages suffered by
the consumer (which will be roughly equivalent to the damages
awarded in court) will generally be very small or nonexistent. In
most cases the consumer will decide that he cannot afford to
bring suit where his chances of recovery are slight and his antici-
pated damage award is small. Hence, a consumer reporting
agency is seldom sued under the FCRA, and if brought to court
is seldom forced to pay damages. In any event, under the present
statutory scheme of liability, the reporting agency will end up pay-
ing less in actual damages than the cost required to effectively
preserve accuracy and confidentiality. A more practical way
to make consumer reporting agencies economically interested in
following FCRA provisions is to establish a minimum recovery
in all cases where the plaintiff establishes liability and hold report-
ing agencies liable for inaccuracies they reasonably should have
discovered or for improper dissemination of information.
In sum, the current civil liability sections of the FCRA °
do not appear to be an adequate deterrent to noncompliance.
The chances of recovery of damages under the Act are sufficiently
remote, and the amount of recovery so insignificant that private
redress to date is virtually nonexistent. While awarding liqui-
dated damages in a civil suit that seeks redress for violations of con-
sumer protection statutes is often considered excessive by indus-
try, the resultant degree of compliance is measureably enhanced
when such damages are available. The obvious analogue is the
Truth in Lending Act, where the minimum $100 civil liability for
noncompliance has, in this writer's view, been the primary impetus
in promoting a relatively high degree of compliance and a sub-
stantial amount of private civil activity. Further, the threat of
crippling class actions which have concerned creditors under the
78. Dart, Arrest and Credit Records: Can the Right of Privacy Survive?,
24 U. FLA. L. REv. 687, 689 (1972).
79. Id.; Comment, Protecting the Subjects of Credit Reports, 80 YALE L.J.
1035-45 (1971).
80. FCRA §§ 606(c), 610(e), 616, 617, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681d(c), 1681h(e),
1681n, 1681o (1970).
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Truth in Lending Act8l cannot realistically be assumed to be pres-
ent with the FCRA. As a rule, the nature of consumer reports and
any resultant liability will differ substantially in the case of each
consumer. If a class action could conceivably be maintained, the
amount to be awarded, if any, would be determined by the court
and any minimum damages provided for in the Act itself could
not apply. However, for individual actions, the minimum liability
approach is deemed essential by this writer to insure a high de-
gree of compliance with the FCRA.
The Absence of Rulemaking
The amendments first proposed by the FTC in July 1973
were designed to correct certain flaws in the FCRA which the
Commission was able to identify to that date. Yet no one is in a
position to know what additional improvements are necessary
until consumers have had the full opportunity to avail them-
selves of the proposed improvements-that is, the right to know
both the reason for a user's adverse action and exactly what is in a
reporting agency's file. After a reasonable period of operating
under an amended Act that adequately affords these basic protec-
tions, the enforcement agency will be better able to determine
whether the obligations of reporters and users require further leg-
islative action., For example, there have been no recommen-
dations concerning a consumer reporting agency's obligations to
keep its files reasonably current. Presently, no express requirement
exists. There have been no recommendations on improving the
provisions dealing with disputing, reinvestigating and correcting
challenged information 2 because of an inadequate opportunity to
observe the manner of compliance with those sections. For in-
stance, the Act affords the consumer the opportunity to insert in
his file his version of any dispute, but there is no express require-
ment that the consumer be told that he has that right."3
While additional improvements may be proposed, if enforce-
ment experience dictates that the need exists, expressly delegat-
ing to the Commission implementing rulemaking authority would
materially enhance the Commission's enforcement capability in
the consumer reporting area. 4  Although the Commission main-
81. The threat of class actions may have been minimized by the recent deci-
sion in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 94 S. Ct. 2140 (1974).
82. FCRA §§ 611-14, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681i-16811 (1970).
83. See FCRA § 611(b), (c), 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(b), (c) (1970).
84. Compare the rulemaking power of the Federal Reserve Board under the
Truth in Lending Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-65 (1970)) which gives the Board
general authority to promulgate regulations. This authority of the Federal Re-
serve Board has been upheld in the courts. See, e.g., Mourning v. Family Publi-
cations Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356 (1973).
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tains that it has inherent rulemaking power to define unfair or de-
ceptive trade practices generally,85 in the specific area of con-
sumer reporting, the issue is clouded by the legislative history re-
ferred to earlier.8 6
The Trend Toward Reform
During the first two years of experience with the FCRA there
was little or no public concern about the Act's shortcomings. A
few law review article§ appeared8 7 but there were no congres-
sional hearings, government reports8 or significant state stat-
utes.89
During 1973, however, several independent activities indi-
cated a clear trend away from accepting the status quo in the
regulation of consumer reporting. For the first time a state stat-
ute was enacted which expressly granted the subject of a con-
sumer report the right to a copy of that report.9" In Canada, a
sweeping consumer reporting law was passed to afford residents
of Ontario more comprehensive rights than those granted in the
FCRA, including the right to a copy of the information on file.9
An advisory committee to the Secretary of the Department of
Health, Education and Welfare released a report in July of 1973
commending the FCRA as constituting "a strong precedent" for the
extensive Code of Fair Information Practice recommended by that
committee.9 2  However, to "achieve the objectives of the Fair
Credit Reporting Act more fully," the committee recommended
,that the Act be amended to provide the consumer with the right
85. The Commission's rulemaking authority has recently been upheld by the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals in National Petroleum Ass'n v. FTC, 482
F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1973), appeal denied, 42 U.S.L.W. 3482 (U.S. Feb. 25,
1974).
86. See note 43 supra.
87. E.g., King, The Impact of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 50 N.C. L.
REv. 852, 872 (1972); Note, The Fair Credit Reporting Act, 23 ME. L. REv.
253, 256 (1971); Note, The Fair Credit Reporting Act, 56 MINN. L. REv. 819,
829 (1971); Note, Protecting Privacy in Credit Reporting, 24 STAN. L. REV. 550
(1972); Comment, Protecting the Subjects of Credit Reports, 80 YALE L.J. 1035
(1971).
88. THE REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON CONSUMER FINANCE,
CONSUMER CREDIT IN THE UNITED STATES (Dec. 1972), mentioned the FCRA
only in passing at pages 212-13. In connection with comments on EFTS (elec-
tronic funds transfer system) the NCCF concluded, "Any law or action or inac-
tion by industry that impedes these flows [of adequate credit information] also
lowers the availability of credit and raises its price to consumers." Id. at 213.
89. See note 12 supra.
90. N.H. STAT. ANN. ch. 359-B:9 111(a) (Supp. 1973). The New Hamp-
shire law has gone largely unnoticed except by the consumer reporting industry.
91. The Consumer Reporting Act, enacted October 30, 1973.
92. Advisory Comm. on Automated Personal Data Systems, Records, Com-
puters and the Rights of Citizens 69 (HEW Pub. No. (s)-73-94, July 1973).
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to personally inspect his record, copy its contents, or. have cop-
ies made. "The choice between inspecting and copying should
be left to the individual, and any charge for having copies made
should be minimal."9  The report further recommended that the
present FCRA exceptions from disclosure to the consumer of med-
ical information and sources of investigative information should
be omitted. Although the definition of "consumer reporting
agency" found in section 603(f) of the FCRA is broad enough
to include some organizations that customarily store medical in-
formation, "nothing in the Act should warrant the inference that
every type of consumer reporting agency may, with impunity,
conceal from an individual the fact that it is gathering, recording
and reporting medical information about him."94  The commit-
tee concluded its discussion of the FCRA with the general state-
statement that it finds "no strong societal interest in having an
individual routinely denied credit, insurance or employment on
the basis of information provided by any source that must be kept
secret from him."" Another notable event since enactment of
FCRA was passage of the Crime Control Act of 1973 granting
individuals full access to their criminal records, including the
right to challenge any information deemed inaccurate or incom-
plete.96
Hearings on Senate Bill 2360 were conducted for one week
during October 1973 by the Senate Consumer Credit Subcommit-
tee. During these hearings virtually unanimous industry opposi-
tion was presented, 7 along with testimony supportive of the legis-
lation by two government agencies and several other witnesses. 98
On November 27, 1973, by a vote of 4-2, the subcommittee de-
cided to table the matter without further action. The reasons
stated can be summarized as follows: (a) the FTC had not docu-
mented the alleged inadequacies to the satisfaction of certain
members; (,b) two years was an inadequate period of time within
93. Id. at 70.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 71.
96. Section 524(b) of the Crime Control Act of 1973, tit. I, 87 Stat. 197,
amending 42 U.S.C. § 3701 et seq. (1970) (The Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act of 1968).
97. Testifying against S. 2360 were: American Bankers Assn.; American
Life Insurance Assn.; American Petroleum Credit Assn.; American Retail Federa-
tion; Associated Credit Bureaus, Inc.; Commercial Services, Inc.; Consumers
Bankers Assn.; Independent Credit Bureau Managers, Inc.; International Con-
sumer Credit Assn.; National Consumer Finance Assn.; and, National Retail Mer-
chants Assn.
98. Supporting the legislation were the American Civil Liberties Union; Fed.
eral Deposit Insurance Corporation; Federal Trade Commission; Senator Edward
Kennedy; and, Professor Arthur R. Miller of Harvard University School of Law,
among others.
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which to fairly test the existing statute; (c) the number of con-
sumer complaints received by the FTC was not a convincing out-
pouring of consumer dissatisfaction with the FCRA, and (d)
the FTC proposed amendments were anti-consumer because, if
adopted, they would substantially increase the cost of consumer
reports and make credit and insurance less available, particularly
to low income consumers.
During 1974 the trend of dissatisfaction with the current
state of affairs in consumer reporting and related areas is ex-
pected to continue. A Senate committee is now considering in-
troducing legislation which will open government personnel files
to its employees, 99 several states are considering the adoption of
expanded versions of the FCRA1°° because of the view of some
legislators that more protection is needed for their constituents,
and reconsideration of Senate Bill 2360 is a definite possibility. In
the House of Representatives, Congresswoman Sullivan is at this
writing considering the introduction of an omnibus bill which
would substantially amend the Consumer Credit Protection Act
of 1968 (Title I of which is the Truth in Lending Act and Title
VI of which is the FCRA). It is possible that such a bill would
incorporate many of the FTC-proposed amendments now found
in Senate Bill 2360.
Finally, for the first time in this writer's memory, the
President's annual State of the Union message made consumer re-
porting a specific matter of national priority. On January 30,
1974, the President told the nation:
One measure of a truly free society is the vigor with
which it protects the liberties of its individual citizens. As
technology has advanced in America, it has increasingly en-
croached on one of those liberties, what I term the right of
personal privacy. Modern information systems, data, banks,
credit records, mailing list abuses, electronic snooping, the
collection of personal data for one purpose that may be used
for another-all these have left millions of Americans deeply
concerned by the privacy they cherish.
And the time has come, therefore, for a major initiative
to define the nature and extent of the basic rights of privacy
and to erect new safeguards to insure that those rights are
respected.
I shall launch such an effort this year at the highest
99. See H.R. 10042 and H.R. 11275, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), entitled
Code of Fair Information Practices of 1973, introduced by Representative Barry
M. Goldwater, Jr. (H.R. 10042 reported in 119 CONo. REc. 7582 (1973); H.R.
11275 reported in 119 CONG. REc. 9639 (1973)).
100. Florida and Washington are currently considering proposed legislation
which would go beyond the FCRA and basically parallel S. 2360.
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levels of the Administration, and I look forward again to
working with this Congress and establishing a new set of
standards that respect the legitimate needs of socuiety but
that also recognize personal privacy as a cardinal principle
of American liberty.' 01
The President followed this statement with the announcement on
February 23, 1974 of the establishment in the White House of a
Domestic Council Committee on the Right of Privacy, chaired
by Vice President Ford. One of the key areas the committee will
examine is the procedure which permits citizens to inspect and
correct information held by public or private organizations.
CONCLUSION
The Fair Credit Reporting Act was enacted by Congress
for the purpose of affording real protection to consumers about
whom reports are made, while regulating the reporting industry
with a minimum of disruption and increase in costs. The FCRA
has not been effective in correcting certain abuses or changing
certain practices largely because these problems were not consid-
ered or known at the time of enactment. The reporting activi-
ties of government were virtually excluded. The fundamental dif-
ferences between credit or insurance users and employment uses
were not explored. The many uses to which consumer reports
are put, beyond those of credit, insurance and employment, were
not carefully contemplated. In spite of these shortcomings, there
is no need to scrap the Fair Credit Reporting Act, although the
word "credit" in its name seems to perpetuate the unwarranted
limited scope of the legislation. The Act can and should serve
as the vehicle whereby Congress enunciates a comprehensive stand-
ard of public policy in the 'broad area of "consumer reporting."
Additionally, there is no valid basis for considering private
consumer reporting in the FCRA and treating government report-
ing in a wholly separate bill. Does it matter to the consumer
whether it is a private or public entity that is infringing upon his
right to privacy or upon his legitimate right to know who is col-
lecting and furnishing information, and what that information
is? Certainly government should not be free to follow a lower
standard of fairness and access than the private sector.
The framework for comprehensive legislation in the entire
consumer reporting area already exists. The Fair Credit Report-
ing Act should be renamed the Fair Consumer Reporting Act
and extended to insure that the following basic rights are ac-
corded to every citizen:
101. Richard M. Nixon, State of the Union Message, N.Y. Times, Jan. 31,
1974, at 20, col. 4.
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1. Full and complete access to and, if desired, a copy of any
and all information collected by the private or public sec-
tor, with the exception of certain law enforcement and
national security investigations;
2. Comprehensive notice, including a copy of the informa-
tion, whenever any user takes any adverse action on the
basis of consumer reporting information;
3. The obtaining of clear authorization from the subject be-
fore any personal investigation is undertaken;
4. Notification to the consumer before a personal report is
furnished for employment purposes; and
5. Sufficient civil liability exposure for user and reporter so
as to constitute a reasonable deterrent to noncompliance.
The Fair Credit Reporting Act is presently art ineffective
and incomplete attempt at reform, but it represents a truly signi-
ficant beginning in the development of legislation to insure to
every citizen the fundamental protections to which he is entitled.
If the Act's current provisions are modified to correct the inade-
quacies discussed above, and extended to afford protection in the
area commonly referred -to as "automated personal data systems"-
whether or not operated or supported by government-real re-
form in consumer reporting will be achieved.
[Vol. '14
